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Capital Regulation: The Road Ahead
Tom de Swaan
INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure for me to be here and to participate in
the discussion of the future of capital adequacy regulation.
I would like to compliment the organizers of this confer-
ence on the programme they have set up, covering many
relevant topics, and the range of experts they have been
able to bring together.
In my address, as I am sure you would expect, I
will approach the issues from a supervisory perspective
and in my capacity as chairman of the Basle Committee.
Most of the questions that have arisen and been discussed
here in the last two days are complicated, and many issues
will require careful review. So do not at this stage expect
me to provide clear answers on specifics. I do hope to be
fairly explicit, however, on some of the more general
issues at stake, in particular on the level of capital
adequacy required for prudential purposes. In other
words, my address today should be seen as part of the
exploratory process that should precede any potentially
major undertaking.
STARTING POINT: THE BASLE ACCORD
When assessing the setup of capital regulation, I take as
my starting point the Basle Capital Accord of 1988. It is
commonly acknowledged that the Accord has made a major
contribution to international bank regulation and super-
vision. The Accord has helped to reverse a prolonged down-
ward tendency in international banks’ capital adequacy
into an upward trend in this decade. This development has
been supported by the increased attention paid by financial
markets to banks’ capital adequacy. Also, the Accord has
effectively contributed to enhanced market transparency, to
international harmonization of capital standards, and thus,
importantly, to a level playing field within the Group of
Ten (G-10) countries and elsewhere. Indeed, virtually all
non-G-10 countries with international banks of signifi-
cance have introduced, or are in the process of introducing,
arrangements similar to those laid down in the Accord.
These are achievements that need to be preserved.
It is often said that the Accord was designed for a
stylized (or simplified) version of the banking industry at
the end of the 1980s and that it tends to be somewhat rigid
in nature—elements, by the way, that have enabled it to be
widely applicable and that have contributed to greater har-
monization. Since 1988, on the other hand, banking and
financial markets have changed considerably. A fairly
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recent trend, but one that clearly stands out, is the rapid
advances in credit risk measurement and credit risk man-
agement techniques, particularly in the United States and
in some other industrialized countries. Credit scoring, for
example, is becoming more common among banks. Some
of the largest and most sophisticated banks have developed
credit risk models for internal or customer use. Asset
securitization, already widespread in U.S. capital markets,
is growing markedly elsewhere, and the same is true for the
credit derivative markets. Moreover, one of the advantages
of the Capital Accord, its simplicity through a small num-
ber of risk buckets, is increasingly criticized.
Against this background, market participants
claim that the Basle Accord is no longer up-to-date and
needs to be modified. As a general response, let me point
out that the Basle Accord is not a static framework but is
being developed and improved continuously. The best
example is, of course, the amendment of January 1996 to
introduce capital charges for market risk, including the
recognition of proprietary in-house models upon the indus-
try’s request. The Basle Committee neither ignores market
participants’ comments on the Accord nor denies that there
may be potential for improvement. More specifically, the
Committee is aware that the current treatment of credit
risk needs to be revisited so as to modify and improve the
Accord, where necessary, in order to maintain its effective-
ness. The same may be true for other risks, but let me first
go into credit risk.
OBJECTIVES
Before going on our way, we should have a clear idea of
what our destination is. One of the objectives for this
undertaking is, at least for supervisors, that the capital
standards should preferably be resilient to changing needs
over time. That is, ideally, they should require less frequent
interpretation and adjustments than is the case with the
present rules. Equally desirable is that capital standards
should accurately reflect the credit risks they insure
against, without incurring a regulatory burden that
would ultimately be unproductive. Substantial differ-
ences between the risks underlying the regulatory capital
requirements and the actual credit risks would entail the
wrong incentives. These would stimulate banks to take
on riskier loans within a certain risk category in pursuit
of a higher return on regulatory capital. To obtain better
insight into these issues, we should further investigate
banks’ methods of determining and measuring credit risk
and their internal capital allocation techniques. In doing
so, however, we should not lose sight of the functions of
capital requirements as discussed in the preceding session
of this conference.
Moreover, the Accord should maintain its trans-
parency as much as possible: with the justified ever-greater
reliance on disclosure, market participants should be able
to assess relatively easily whether a bank complies with the
capital standards and to what extent. Especially in this
respect, the present Accord did an outstanding job. Every
self-respecting bank extensively published its Bank for
International Settlements ratios.
Capital requirements foster the safety and sound-
ness of banks by limiting leverage and by providing a
buffer against unexpected losses. Sufficient capital also
decreases the likelihood of a bank becoming insolvent and
limits—via loss absorption and greater public confidence—
the adverse effects of bank failures. And by providing an
incentive to exercise discipline in risk taking, capital can
mitigate moral hazard and thus protect depositors and
deposit insurance. Admittedly, high capital adequacy ratios
do not guarantee a bank’s soundness, particularly if the
risks being taken are high or the bank is being misman-
aged. Therefore, supervisors consider a bank’s capital ade-
quacy in the context of a host of factors. But the bottom
line is that capital is an important indicator of a bank’s
condition—for financial markets as well as depositors and
bank regulators—and that minimum capital requirements
are one of the essential supervisory instruments.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Therefore, it should be absolutely clear that, when it
assesses the treatment of credit risk, the Basle Committee
will have no predetermined intention whatsoever of
reducing overall capital adequacy requirements—maybe
even the contrary. Higher capital requirements could
prove necessary, for example, for bank loans to higher riskFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 233
countries. In fact, this has been publicly recognized by
bank representatives in view of the recent Asian crisis.
More generally, we should be aware of the potential insta-
bility that can result from increased competition among
banks in the United States and European countries in the
longer run. And we should not be misled by the favourable
financial results that banks are presently showing, but keep
in mind that bad banking times can—and will—at some
point return. In those circumstances, credit risk will still
turn out to be inflexible, still difficult to manage, and still
undoubtedly, as it has always been, the primary source of
banks’ losses. Absorption of such losses will require the
availability of capital. A reduction of capital standards
would definitely not be the right signal from supervisors to
the industry, nor would it be expedient.
Of course, I am aware of the effects of capital stan-
dards on the competitiveness of banks as compared with
largely unregulated nonbank financial institutions such as
the mutual funds and finance companies in the United
States. Admittedly, this is a difficult issue. On the one
hand, too stringent capital requirements for banks that
deviate too much from economic capital requirements
would impair their ability to compete in specific lending
activities. On the other hand, capital standards should not
per se be at the level implicitly allowed for by market
forces. Competition by its very nature brings prices down
but, alas, not the risks. If competitive pressures were to
erode the spread for specific instruments to the point where
no creditor is being fully compensated for the risks
involved, prudent banks should consider whether they
want to be involved in that particular business in the first
place. It is therefore up to supervisors to strike the optimal
balance between the safety and soundness of the banking
system and the need for a level playing field. In the longer
run, efforts should be made to harmonize capital require-
ments among different institutions conducting the same
activities, or at least to bring them into closer alignment.
A first exchange of views on this takes place in the joint
forum on the supervision of financial conglomerates.
Another principle that the Basle Committee wants
to uphold is that the basic framework of the Capital
Accord—that is, minimum capital requirements based on
risk-weighted exposures—has not outlived its usefulness.
The rapid advances in credit risk measurement and credit
risk management techniques are only applicable to sophis-
ticated, large financial institutions. When discussing
changes in the present Capital Accord, one should remem-
ber that it is not only being applied by those sophisticated
institutions but by tens of thousands of banks all over the
world. The Asian crisis has underlined once again that
weak supervision, including overly lax capital standards,
can have severe repercussions on financial stability. In the
core principles for effective banking supervision published
by the Basle Committee last year, it is clearly indicated
that application of the Basle Capital Accord for banks is an
important prerequisite for a sound banking system.
Changes in the Capital Accord should take into account
that the sophisticated techniques referred to above require
among other things sophisticated risk management stan-
dards and a large investment in information technology—
preconditions most banks in both industrialized and
emerging countries cannot meet in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, for these banks, the basic assumptions of the
present Accord should be maintained as much as possible.
Precisely because the Capital Accord is relatively simple,
the framework is useful for banks and their supervisors
in emerging market countries and contributes to market
transparency.
Keeping that in mind, one should, however,
acknowledge that the current standards are not based on
precise measures of credit risk, but on proxies for it in the
form of broad categories of banking assets. Indeed, banks
regularly call for other (that is, lower) risk weightings of
specific instruments. In order to obtain more precise
weightings, the Basle Committee should be willing to con-
sider less arbitrary ways to determine credit risks. But it is
unrealistic to expect that internationally applicable risk
weightings can be established that accurately reflect banks’
risks at all times and under all conditions. Compromises in
this respect are inevitable.
CREDIT RISK MODELS
A way out may be to refer to banks’ own methods and
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analogous to the treatment of market risks. At present, I
would describe credit risk models as still being in a devel-
opment stage, although the advances that some banks have
made in this area are potentially significant. Ideally, as
sound credit risk models bring forward more precise
estimates of credit risk, these models will be beneficial for
banks. Models can be and are used in banks’ commercial
operations—for example, in pricing, in portfolio manage-
ment or performance measurement, and naturally in risk
management. The quantification that a model entails
implies a greater awareness and transparency of risks
within a bank. More precise and concise risk information
will enhance internal communication, decision making,
and subsequent control of credit risk. Also, models enable
banks to allow for the effects of portfolio diversification
and of trading of credit risks or hedging by means of
credit derivatives. So it can be assumed that a greater
number of banks will introduce credit risk models and
start to implement them in their day-to-day credit opera-
tions, once the technical challenges involved in modeling
have been solved.
The more difficult question is whether credit risk
models could be used for regulatory capital purposes, just
as banks’ internal models for market risk are now being
used. As should be clear from what I have just said, credit
risk models can have advantages from a prudential point of
view. For this reason, the Committee is conscious of the
need not to impede their development and introduction in
the banking industry. However, there are still serious
obstacles on this road. First, credit risk models come with
substantial statistical and conceptual difficulties. To men-
tion just a few: credit data are sparse, correlations cannot be
easily observed, credit returns are skewed, and, because of
the statistical problems, back testing in order to assess a
model’s output may not be feasible. Clearly, there are
model risks here. 
Second, if models were to be used for regulatory
capital purposes, competitive equality within the banking
industry could be compromised. Because the statistical
assumptions and techniques used differ, it is very likely
that credit risk models’ results are not comparable across
banks. The issue of competitive equality would be compli-
cated even further by the potential differences in required
capital between banks using models and banks using the
current approach. 
Third, and most important, a credit risk model
cannot replace a banker’s judgement. Models do not manage.
A model can only contribute to sound risk management
and should be embedded in it. This leads me to conclude
that if credit risk models are to be used for regulatory
capital purposes, they should not be judged in isolation.
Supervisors should also carefully examine and supervise the
qualitative factors in a bank’s risk management and set
standards for those factors. A possible stragegy would be to
start applying models for a number of asset categories for
which the technical difficulties mentioned before are more
or less overcome, while at the same time maintaining the
present—albeit reassessed—Accord for other categories.
This clearly has the advantage of giving an incentive to the
market to  develop the models approach further so that the
approach can be applied to all credits. On the other hand,
it might jeopardize transparency.
  MARKET RISK AND THE PRECOMMITMENT 
APPROACH
Let me now make a short detour and discuss the supervi-
sory treatment of risks other than credit risk. First, market
risk. Although the internal models approach was intro-
duced only recently, research work is going on and possible
alternatives to this approach are being developed. The
Federal Reserve, for instance, has proposed the precommit-
ment approach. Its attractive features are that it incor-
porates a judgement on the effectiveness of a bank’s risk
management, puts greater emphasis on the incentives for a
bank to avoid losses exceeding the limit it has predeter-
mined, and reduces the regulatory burden. In my opinion,
however, under this approach, too, a bank’s choice of a cap-
ital commitment and the quality of its risk management
system still need to be subject to supervisory review. And
there are a number of other issues that are as yet
unsolved—for example, comparability across firms given
that the choice of the precommitment is subjective, the
role of public disclosure, and the supervisory penalties,
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reasons, international supervisors will have to study the
results of the New York Clearing House pilot study
carefully.
OTHER RISKS
Now, let me turn to the other risks. If one leaves aside the
recent amendment with respect to market risks, it is true
that the Capital Accord deals explicitly with credit risk
only. Yet the Accord provides for a capital cushion for
banks, which is meant to absorb more losses than just those
due to credit risks. Therefore, if the capital standards for
credit risk were to be redefined, an issue that cannot be
avoided is how to go about treating the other risks. Aware-
ness of, for instance, operational, legal, and reputational
risks among banks is increasing. Some banks are already
putting substantial effort into data collection and quantifi-
cation of these risks. This is not surprising. Some new
techniques, such as credit derivatives and securitization
transactions, alleviate credit risk but increase operational
and legal risks, while several cases of banks’ getting into
problems because of fraud-related incidents have led to an
increased attention to reputational risk. Not surprisingly,
then, the Basle Committee will also be considering the
treatment of risks that are at present implicitly covered by
the Accord, such as those just mentioned and possibly
interest rate risk as well. 
In this process, it will be important to distinguish
between quantifiable and nonquantifiable risks and their
respective supervisory treatments. More specifically, the
Committee will have to consider whether it should stick to a
single capital standard embracing all risks, including market
risks, or adopt a system of capital standards for particular
risks—that is, the quantifiable ones—in combination
with a supervisory review of the remaining risk categories.
From a theoretical point of view, one capital standard
might be preferable, since risks are not additive. Given the
present state of knowledge, however, one all-encompassing
standard for banking risks that takes account of their
interdependencies still seems far away. As the trend thus
far has been toward the development of separate models for
the major quantifiable risks, a system of capital standards
together with a supervisory review of other, nonquantifi-
able risks seems more likely.
CONCLUSION
The overall issue of this conference, particularly of this
session, is where capital regulation is heading. In my
address, I have argued that, since supervisory objectives are
unchanged, a reduction in banks’ capital adequacy would
not be desirable. Alterations in the basic framework of the
Capital Accord should not only take into account the
developments in risk measurement techniques as increas-
ingly applied by sophisticated banks, but should also
reflect the worldwide application of the Accord. The Basle
Committee is committed to maintaining the effectiveness
of capital regulation and is willing to consider improve-
ments, where possible. In this regard, the advances made
by market participants in measuring and modeling credit
and other risks are potentially significant. They should be
carefully studied for their applicability to prudential
purposes and might at some point be incorporated into
capital regulation. But before we reach that stage, there are
still formidable obstacles to be overcome.
Thank you.
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